

Mathieu Dubois et Renaud Meltz (dir.)

# De part et d'autre du Danube

L'Allemagne, l'Autriche et les Balkans  
de 1815 à nos jours

Mélanges en l'honneur  
du professeur Jean-Paul Bled

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PREMIÈRE PARTIE

**Le Viennois :  
de l'Autriche des Habsbourg  
aux Balkans des nations**





L'Autriche-Hongrie et les Balkans  
travaillés par les nationalismes  
au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle



*Lothar Höbelt*

## THE FATHER-IN-LAW OF EUROPE

Tiny Montenegro had famously been called Russia's only friend after the Crimean War. Yet, in 1916/17, the Tsar was no longer defending the Petrovic dynasty against a takeover bid by their Serbian neighbours, even if this so-called "Balkan Anschluss" was, for the time being, a game among exiles. When King Nikita had wanted to go into exile in Russia in 1916, the Tsar refused to accommodate that request; Nicholas II wanted to prevent his arrival "by all means necessary".<sup>1</sup> What counted against King Nikita's return were the allegations that he and his family had secretly been negotiating with the Central Powers. Literature abounds with description of allies as "secret enemies".<sup>2</sup> In the Montenegrin case, the question was the other way round: Had the most colourful antagonist of the Habsburgs finally turned into their "secret ally"? And if so, why weren't the Austrians more appreciative?

Montenegro was often derided as an operetta state. Patriotic students did indeed stage angry protests when Lehar's "Merry Widow" featured dandy diplomats of a Balkan principality, thinly disguised as "Pontevedro".<sup>3</sup> If operettas usually revolve around love-stories, the analogy was certainly pertinent: Nikita had replaced Leopold of Belgium as the father-in-law of Europe. He managed to marry his bevy of pretty daughters to best advantage: Two of them (Milica and Anastasia) were married to Russian Grand Dukes in 1889; during the war

- 1 Srdja Pavlovic, *Balkan Anschluss. The Annexation of Montenegro and the Creation of the Common South Slavic State*, West Lafayette, 2008, p. 98.
- 2 Gary Shanafelt, *The Secret Enemy. Austria-Hungary and the German Alliance, 1914-1918*, Boulder, 1985.
- 3 John D. Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle. Montenegro and Austria-Hungary, 1908-1914*, West Lafayette, 1983; Elizabeth Roberts, *Realm of the Black Mountain. A History of Montenegro*, London, 2007; Heiko Brendel, "Die österreichisch-ungarische Besetzung Montenegros im Ersten Weltkrieg als habsburgischer Imperialkrieg", in Tanja Bühner (ed.), *Imperialkriege von 1500 bis heute. Strukturen, Akteure, Lernprozesse*, Paderborn 2011, pp. 129-47; here: 132 notes that only censorship prevented the author of the libretto to use the real name.

Milica, as the wife of the Army Commander “Nikolasha”, Nicholas II’s uncle, was credited with gladly sporting her Slav credentials against the “German” Czarina;<sup>4</sup> Elena had also been educated in Russia where she flirted with a Guards officer by name of Mannerheim, who was later to become famous as leader of Finland.<sup>5</sup> In the end, though, Elena was married off to the future Vittorio Emanuele III of Italy in 1896.<sup>6</sup> Zorka had married Peter Karageorgevic in 1883 (but died before her husband actually became king of Serbia after the coup d’état in 1903!), Xenia remained her father’s confidant and was often thought of as the eminence grise at the court of Cetinje.<sup>7</sup>

80 It was Nikita who made the first move that precipitated the First Balkan War in October 1912. However, observers noted that his closest ally during that war was not his son-in-law, King Petar of Serbia, but the Bulgarian Czar, Ferdinand, a German prince and Hungarian magnate.<sup>8</sup> After the Second Balkan War Nikita created an international crisis by his refusal to lift the siege of Skutari. Rumor credited him with combining his challenge to the great powers with a stock-exchange operation: This was insider trading at the top level. Once he accepted the Great Powers’ ultimatum, peace would be assured and share prices would sky-rocket. But there was only one person in all of Europe, who knew exactly when that would happen, the King of Montenegro himself...<sup>9</sup>

#### UNWILLING WARRIOR

In 1914, Montenegro loyally followed suit and declared war on Austria. For the first few months of the war, a Serbian officer, Bozidar Jankovic, even took over as Chief-of-Staff.<sup>10</sup> Montenegro, with a population of less than half a million, fielded an army of more than 50,000 men. In return, the Entente consented to pay 50,000 francs a day for the duration of the war.<sup>11</sup> The Montenegrin war

4 Dominic Lieven, *Nicholas II. Twilight of the Empire*, New York, 1994, p. 212.

5 Marco Houston, *Nikola & Milena. King & Queen of the Black Mountain. The Petrovic-Njegos Dynasty*, London, 2003, pp. 192-7.

6 Italians even tried to persuade Nikita to use his influence with the Serb party in Dubrovnik to cooperate with the Italians in city politics; Luciano Monzali, *The Italians of Dalmatia. From Italian Unification to World War I*, Toronto, 2009, pp. 173, 200, 219.

7 Treadway, Falcon and Eagle 217; on Xenia, Court Marshal Ramadanovic’s comments to Otto, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Politisches Archiv (PA) I 953, fol. 229, telegram No. 7, 28 Jan. 1916.

8 Treadway, Falcon and Eagle 106 f., 130. In 1915, too, Ferdinand argued that Serbia should be partitioned but Montenegro enlarged; see Andre Scherer & Jacques Grunewald, *L’Allemagne et les problèmes de la paix pendant la première guerre mondiale*, Paris, 1962, vol. 1, pp. 216 f., 14 Nov. 1915.

9 HHStA, Baernreither Papers, Diary XI, fol. 88.

10 Pavlovic, *Balkan Anschluss*, p. 68.

11 HHStA, PA I 953, fol. 50, 2 Feb. 1916. Otto’s report of a conversation with Popovic.

effort consisted of a few raids into the Hercegovina; even more important, from the top of Mount Lovcen, Montenegrin artillery – provided by the French – trained their guns on the Bocche di Cattaro, Austria-Hungary's second most important naval port. Gun-running across the Adriatic led to a number of minor naval engagements, with U-boats crews correctly boarding sailing boats to search for contraband, the way maritime law demanded.<sup>12</sup>

When Italy declared war on Austria in May 1915, despite family ties neither Nikita nor the Serbs hurried to assist their new allies, who claimed most of Dalmatia for themselves, but tried to outbid them in Albania. Nikita repeated his 1913 manoeuvre and marched his troops into Skutari, once again.<sup>13</sup> The Italians were not amused. In return, they broke off diplomatic relations with Montenegro and stopped all food supplies.<sup>14</sup> Interestingly, when Austro-Hungarian Foreign Secretary Baron Burian reviewed the critical situation with his Reich German partners soon after, he dismissed the Montenegrins with a wave of the hand: "They were only conducting a phoney war."<sup>15</sup>

However, the Italian threat went a long way towards persuading the Austrians that they had to get rid of at least one their three fronts. The Chiefs-of-Staff, Conrad and Falkenhayn, both thought about a separate peace with Russia but Burian thought chances of a Russian offer were nil. As an alternative, even a fire-eater like Conrad mused about coming to an arrangement with Serbia. So did Count Alec Hoyos who preferred a peace with Serbia to ceding territory to Italy.<sup>16</sup> After all, Serbia was clearly unhappy with the terms of the treaty of London that promised Italy almost complete control of the Adriatic at the expense of Yugoslav aspirations. Serbia was even less happy with the hints of her partners that she should cede a large part of her recent Macedonian conquests to Bulgaria. Serbian Prime Minister Pasic adamantly refused to do so. When the Russian ambassador charged that he faced a choice between the realization of Yugoslav dreams and a few miserable mountain hamlets, he answered he would

12 Wladimir Aichelburg, *Die Unterseeboote Österreich-Ungarns*, Graz, 1981, pp. 84, 123, 148, 490.

13 Jankovic resigned in protest against that move (Pavlovic, *Balkan Anschluss*, pp. 71-2). Whether the invasion of Albania really "proved to be the incident that finally discredited the Montenegrin king among his war allies", is debatable; after all, Serbia did the same; and France agreed. The Russian representative in Belgrade claimed that Nikita had concluded a secret armistice with the Austrians; but again, there is no confirmation from Austrian sources. Lothar Höbelt, "Der Balkan und die Strategie der Entente", in Jürgen Angelow (ed.), *Der Erste Weltkrieg auf dem Balkan. Perspektiven der Forschung*, Berlin, 2011, pp. 57-73, here: 60 f.

14 HHStA, PA I 953, fol. 225, report 10/P, 14 March 1916. Otto's source was the Greek charge d'affaires Rentis who stayed in Cetinje.

15 HHStA, PA I 503, Liasse XLVII/3-16bis, fol. 54, 27 June 1915.

16 Kriegsarchiv (KA), B/16: Marterer diary, 2 June 1915; B/15: Kundmann-diary 28 May 1915; HHStA, PA I 952, Liasse 25g, Memorandum by Hoyos, May 1915, together with a note by Burian that Serbia would not play along.

still choose Macedonia.<sup>17</sup> Thus, a volte face was not perhaps quite as far-fetched as it might seem at first sight.

However, with peace overtures of almost any sort, one of the great obstacles was the question of who was going to make the first move that could be interpreted as a sign of weakness.

This is where Nikita seems to have stepped into the breach. He used a certain Baron Kruffyff, a far-flung relative of the Petrovic family<sup>18</sup> and a correspondent of the 'Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant', as an intermediary. On 3 July 1915 Kruffyff approached an old acquaintance, Egger, who had formerly served in Cetinje and was now working at the Austrian Embassy in Bulgaria. The proposals submitted showed that Nikita still acted as a loyal ally of Serbia, if not of the Entente. Serbia would cede a much smaller part of Macedonia to Bulgaria in return for keeping the northern half of Albania; Montenegro would not cede anything but even acquire a few villages at the southernmost tip of Dalmatia (Budva and Spizza) at Austria's expense.<sup>19</sup>

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Kruffyff hinted that there was a power struggle going on within Montenegrin ruling circles. Queen Elena, her brother Petar and the Popovic family favoured closer links with Italy and a renewal of the war-effort; Crown prince Danilo together with his brother Mirko and Xenia – for once united – opposed that policy.<sup>20</sup> A few weeks later, Xenia was even reported to have claimed that her brother-in-law, the Russian high commander Nikolaj, was willing to countenance the separate peace so ardently desired by the Central powers, exchanging Poland for Armenia.<sup>21</sup> Such a proposal, coming from the supposed hardliners, might sound fascinating, but also stretched credulity. In May, Austria might have jumped at a way out; but by late summer, her military fortunes had improved. Count Forgacs, a former ambassador to Belgrade, who was privately contacted by Egger, showed the letter to Burian but both immediately rejected the offer out of hand.<sup>22</sup> At roughly the same time, Ferdinand of Bulgaria had finally consented to take the jump and join the Central Powers. Thus, the Montenegrin offer came too late. Col. Laxa, the military attache, reported

<sup>17</sup> Wolfgang-Uwe Friedrich, *Bulgarien und die Mächte 1913-1915*, Stuttgart, 1985, p. 269.

<sup>18</sup> Burian once referred to him obliquely as "a relative of the divorced husband of Prince Danilo's sister" (Scherer/Grunewald I 229).

<sup>19</sup> HHStA, PA XV 78, Varia, fol. 14-18, Egger to Forgach, 4 & 5 July, 1915. I owe this piece of information to my student Alexander Leeb who is preparing a thesis on Bulgaria in World War I.

<sup>20</sup> HHStA, PA XV 78, Varia, fol. 28, Egger to Forgach, 11 July 1915; fol. 33, Tarnowski to Forgach, 28 July 1915.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 39, telegram Sofia 913, 17 August 1915.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 23, Forgacs to Tarnowski, 13 July, 1915.

Serbian diplomats were aghast the Austrians had not tried to turn the resentment against Entente bullying to their advantage.<sup>23</sup>

Hints about Montenegrin willingness to negotiate with the Central powers also surfaced elsewhere. British sources claimed that Prince Petar had been in touch with Major Lompar, the commander of the Austrian garrison at Budva, the southernmost tip of the Empire, as early as the spring of 1915. Others dismiss that story as the rumors started by political enemies to discredit the Petrovic dynasty and facilitate the absorption of the country into Serbia. Actually, that particular rumor clearly falls into the category of disinformation because Budva was at that time still occupied by the Montenegrins – and Lompar was a Montenegrin officer, not an Austrian one.<sup>24</sup> There is an entry by General Marterer, however, from the Emperor's Military Chancellery, who confided to his diary that Petar had apparently requested an interview with Col. Hupka, the former Austrian Military Attache in Cetinje, ostensibly to talk about an exchange of prisoners.<sup>25</sup>

In August 1915, Crown Prince Danilo had visited Athens. Afterwards, King Constantine told the Austrian Minister that Danilo had complained about Russia and asked the King to put in a good word for Montenegro so that she would not be treated badly once peace-making started.<sup>26</sup> Konstantin, of course, happened to be the brother-in-law of the Kaiser. Thus it is easy to understand why these peace-feelers initially found their way to Berlin, rather than to Vienna. A few months later, Conrad alluded to intercepted Italian reports that Montenegro was inclined to enter into peace negotiations with Vienna and Berlin. He added: "But I don't know whether these have actually taken place."<sup>27</sup> He acknowledged that Danilo inclined towards the monarchy but described him as irresolute and withdrawn, a man who would be content with a semblance of power.<sup>28</sup>

It was not the Austrians who insisted on overrunning Serbia in 1915 but her Prussian allies who did so because they were eager to open a line-of-communications to the Turks who needed shells to continue their defence of

23 KA, Militärattachés Sofia 83, Tel K. 1945 (27th August 1915). Another feeler had been put out via the Serb Minister to Bucarest and the pro-Austrian Rumanian politician Marghiloman; once again Vienna's reaction was they saw "no reason to approach the Serbs"; HHStA, PA I 952, Liasse 258, Czernin's telegramms 947 (13 August), 952 (14 August), 963 (19 August 1915).

24 Peter Enne, *Die österreichisch-ungarische Offensive gegen Montenegro 1916*, Master's Thesis, Vienna, 2008, p. 162; Roberts, *Realm of the Black Mountain*, p. 312.

25 KA, B/16, Marterer Tagebuch, 11 & 18 August 1915.

26 HHStA, PA XVI 66, Telegram 855, 30 August 1915. In November, Danilo suggested that an enlarged Montenegro might be a good counterbalance to a Greater Bulgaria; KA, Militärattachés Sofia 83, Tel K 287, 10 Nov. 1915.

27 HHStA, PA I 499, fol. 292, Conrad to Burian, 26 Nov. 1915.

28 HHStA, PA I 499, fol. 306, Conrad to Burian, 7 Dec. 1915; Houston, Nikola & Milena 238, 334.

the Straits. During the summer, a plan of campaign was worked out. Germany, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria should each contribute half-a-dozen divisions to crush Serbia. As it happened, Conrad squandered his reserves by an ill-advised offensive into the Pripjet swamps. Thus, when the Germans finally crossed the Danube on 7 October, they were joined by no more than two Austrian divisions. It was Mackensen, a swashbuckling Hussar with charming manners, whom Falkenhayn wanted to play off against Hindenburg, who commanded the forces of the Central Powers.<sup>29</sup>

Politically, the German ambassador to Vienna, Tschirschky, on 4 November suggested that Serbia, Montenegro and Albania should all be united under the Petrovic dynasty.<sup>30</sup> At the same time, Kruffyff got in touch with Egger and Tarnowski again.<sup>31</sup> This time, Kruffyff was supposed to act in the name of Crown Prince Danilo, who had left Montenegro and was recuperating at a sanatorium in Lausanne. In December, Kruffyff even came to Vienna himself but was not received by Forgacs who told him he could only talk to him once he produced formal credentials as a plenipotentiary.<sup>32</sup>

In the meantime, Serbia had already been decisively defeated. The Germans were not interested in following Sarrail's belated Army of the Orient into Greece; nor did they want to prolong the campaign by conquering Montenegro. Mackensen was unpleasantly surprised to learn that the Austrians had started their campaign against Montenegro without even consulting him. Conrad had long argued that the Germans refusal to pursue the campaign any further had also invalidated Mackensen's command of the Balkan front. On 20 December 1915 Kövess – the commander of the Austro-Hungarian 3rd Army – was ordered to go ahead and invade the Black Mountains, both to cut off the Serbian army whose escape has once been compared to the British evacuation at Dunkirk, and to forestall an Italian occupation of Albania.<sup>33</sup>

With the Serbian army in full retreat towards the Adriatic, Montenegro was an easy prey, even if logistics and climate still provided challenges. In general, the Austrians enjoyed a numerical superiority of roughly two to one. On their

<sup>29</sup> Theo Schwarzmüller, *Zwischen Kaiser und "Führer". Generalfeldmarschall August von Mackensen*, Paderborn, 1995, p. 142. The staff officer who organized the crossing of the Danube, was none other than Col. Hentsch, the scape-goat for Moltke's decision to order a withdrawal during the Battle of the Marne (*ibid.*, p. 133).

<sup>30</sup> HHStA, PA I 952, Liasse 25g, Notiz by Tschirschky, 4 Nov. 1915.

<sup>31</sup> HHStA, PA I 952, Liasse 25g, Tarnowski's telegram 1449 (11 Nov.), 1474 (16 Nov. 1915).

<sup>32</sup> HHStA, PA I 952, Liasse 25g, letters between Forgach and Kruffyff, 16 to 18 Dec. 1915; Montenuovo also told Bechtold about Danilo's "verklausulierte Anfrage" via Athens and Berlin (HHStA, Berchtold Papers 5, diary 8 Dec. 1915).

<sup>33</sup> Lothar Baumgartner, "Österreich-Ungarns Dünkirchen? Eine Gegenüberstellung von Berichten zum Abtransport der serbischen Armee aus Albanien im Winter 1915/16", *Marine-gestern, heute* 9 (1982), pp. 46-53.



Eastern flank, in the Sandzak, they even suffered a reverse on 7 January, at the hands of General Vesovic, in the battle of Moskovac; the Montenegrins thus achieving their most celebrated feat of arms a few days before their surrender.<sup>34</sup> Still, the storming of the 1.800 metre high mountain peak of the Lovcen in mid-winter was an astonishing feat of arms, helped by gun fire from ships that had to be artificially heeled in order to fire their guns at such a elevated targets. Some of the few Austrian aircraft even bombed Skutari (but not Cetinje). One of their flying aces, Julius Arigi, had been taken prisoner by the Montenegrins in the autumn but during the chaos of the last few days managed to escape from Podgorica barracks in one of the king's cars.<sup>35</sup> Nikita himself was forced to leave his capital. When the Austrians occupied his palace on 13 January 1916, they found the wily king had kept – or re-arranged – the signed portrait of Franz Joseph on top of his desk.<sup>36</sup>

#### ANSCHLUSS OR ALLIANCE?

Montenegro had been defeated in the field. The political repercussions of the conquest were still far from clear, however. Serbia was branded as the fountain of all evil, the state that had started the war by abetting terrorism. No such stigma was attached to Montenegro. Thus, it might be seen as a clever political move to persuade the realm of the Black Mountains to conclude an “Erstlingsfriede”. Francis Joseph might proffer an olive branch to a fellow sovereign who asked for forgiveness. There were two pre-conditions the Austrians were likely to insist on: For strategic reasons, the Austrians were eager to annex the Lovcen as well as to cut off Montenegro from the Adriatic, thus at the same time providing a link between the Monarchy and Albania.

The big question was whether Montenegro should be allowed to survive as a state at all.

Conrad had returned to his all-or-nothing approach and wanted to annex all of Montenegro, just as he wanted to do away with the failed state of Albania and grab most of it for the Monarchy, leaving the Southern half as a bait for Greece to join the Central Powers. Hungarian Prime Minister Count Istvan Tisza – as usual – was clearly opposed to such a programme of unlimited expansion. He feared indigestion and preferred to limit territorial gains to border

34 Serbo Rastoder, *Montenegro 1914-1991*. In: *Österreichische Osthefte* 47 (2008), pp. 315-332; here: 317.

35 Ernst Peter, *Die k.u.k. Luftschiiffer- und Fliegertruppe Österreich-Ungarns 1794-1919*, Stuttgart, 1981, p. 279. After the war, Arigi – as a Sudeten German – served for ten years as the top pilot of the Czech Aero Company.

36 Enne, *Offensive*, p. 38 ff.; Carl Mühlmann, *Oberste Heeresleitung und Balkan im Weltkrieg 1914/1918*, Berlin, 1942, p. 145; Holger Afflerbach, *Falkenhayn*, Munich, 1994, p. 344.

rectifications. Burian tried to mediate between the two positions. He argued that definite solutions could only be arrived at once the war came to an end. But in the beginning, at least, he seemed willing to consider a unification of Montenegro and a rump-state of Serbia under the Petrovic dynasty.<sup>37</sup>

Conrad's annexationist programme was a move directed not so much against Austria's enemies as against her allies. The general, of course, realized that if the monarchy lost the war, all her gains would be null and void; but if she won the war, her allies would find themselves confronted with a *fait accompli*. That's why he urged the Ballhausplatz to issue a formal proclamation to dissolve Serbia and unseat the Karageorgevic family. In retrospect, Conrad argued that if such a declaration had in fact been issued, Nikita would certainly have thrown himself at the tender mercies of the Austrians to escape a similar fate.<sup>38</sup> Yet, it is doubtful whether that is what the military really wanted. On 3 January 1916, Conrad's idea was to reduce Montenegro to its pre-1912 territory and bring it into a close partnership with the monarchy. Forty-eight hours later he raised the stakes: Montenegro would have to surrender unconditionally, the "suspect dynasty with its Russian and Italian in-laws" should be done away with.<sup>39</sup> Burian agreed with the demand for an unconditional surrender but hedged his bets about the future of the state and the dynasty. Interestingly, General Sarkotic the military governor of Bosnia, himself a South Slav, also wanted to entice Nikita to switch to the Central Powers.<sup>40</sup>

The Austrian military had already rejected a first call for a cease-fire. On 13 January, after the Lovcen and Cetinje had fallen, Nikita let himself be persuaded by his government to appeal directly to Francis Joseph and his "coeur généreux et chevaleresque", "in the hope that you will mediate so that a just and honourable peace settlement is reached."<sup>41</sup> The Emperor replied that he was glad Nikita was ready to end a resistance that had become pointless. He would send delegates to conduct peace negotiations once the terms of the armistice had been accepted. Those terms were certainly harsh: On a purely military level, what Conrad seems to have feared most was a dissolution of the Montenegrin army that created a potential for guerilla warfare. In such a case,

37 Scherer/Grunewald I 185 (28 Sept. 1915), 210 (11 Nov. 1915). Jagow liked the idea but did not see why Nikita was preferable to King Petar; in the long run he thought Serbia – like all the other Balkan states – was going to be ruled by a king recruited from abroad (*ibid.*, p. 203).

38 HHStA, PA I 499, fol. 477 v., Conrad to Burian, 31 Jan. 1916.

39 HHStA, PA I 953, fol. 402, Wiesner's telegrams 3 & 5 Jan. 1916.

40 Enne, *Offensive*, pp. 91, 133.

41 HHStA, PA I 953, fol. 297, 318, 310; Pavlovic, *Balkan Anschluss*, p. 77.

he threatened, the Austrians would have to insist on the internment of the whole male population of military age.<sup>42</sup>

On 16 January, two Montenegrin diplomats (one of them Jovo Popovic, the former ambassador to Constantinople) and one officer (Major Petar Lompar) arrived in Cetinje and accepted the terms of the armistice in principle. The Austrians in turn agreed to put a stop to hostilities but reserved the right to continue their operations against the Serbs. But when it was time to hand over the details for the implementation of the truce the next morning, the Austrians found that the Montenegrin delegation had already left Cetinje again.<sup>43</sup> This misunderstanding gave rise to suspicions that the Montenegrins only wanted to play for time. As a result, the Montenegrin capitulation was delayed by roughly a week. The Austrians only managed to hand over their demands in the early hours of the 19 January. In the afternoon, the Montenegrins rejected some of the clauses (in particular, the one about handing over all Serb military personnel on Montenegrin territory). However, the Montenegrin government asked the Austrian Foreign Office to intercede with the Army High Command that fighting should not be resumed, nevertheless. The Austrians reacted with an ultimatum that was originally supposed to run out at high-noon on 21 January but was then prolonged for another day.

At the last minute (actually half an hour late) on 22 January, Lompar did return to Cetinje. There were no further difficulties: Agreement was reached that very night. On 25 January, 6 p.m., the armistice terms were officially signed. Arms were to be handed over within the next week; on the advice of the Chief-of-staff of the 3rd Army, the Austrians had after all shied away from the gargantuan task of interning tens of thousands of Montenegrins; perhaps, an intervention of the heir apparent, Archduke Charles, also had something to do with the more generous terms.<sup>44</sup> Instead, the Austrians accepted a guarantee of the Montenegrin government that all men of military age would quietly return to their homes; moreover, all Montenegrins who had surrendered after 17 January no longer counted as prisoners of war.<sup>45</sup>

However, a lot had changed within the last week. Apparently, Nikita had taken fright when he first heard about the Austrian terms on 17 January.

42 HHStA, PA I 953, fol. 333, Conrad to Burian, 16 Jan. 1916. Conrad also warned Bolfras, the head of the Emperor's Military Chancellery, against any watering down of the armistice terms; cf. Helmut Rumpler, "Die Kriegsziele Österreich-Ungarns auf dem Balkan 1915/16", in *Österreich und Europa. Festgabe für Hugo Hantsch*, Graz, 1965, pp. 465-482; here: 472.

43 HHStA, PA I 953 contains two summaries of the negotiations: fol. 440-445 (drawn up by the Ballhausplatz) and fol. 57-61 (by Col. Slamecka); there is only a brief summary in *Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg*, Vol. IV, Vienna, 1933, p. 58.

44 HHStA, Berchtold diary 22nd Jan. 1916 records that Charles had been sent to make Conrad acquiesce; Enne, *Offensive*, p. 127.

45 HHStA, PA I 953, fol. 101, Wiesner's report, 25 Jan. 1916.

Indeed, there was a certain studied ambivalence whether the threat to intern all grown-up males included the King and the royal family, too. Actually, when Austrian diplomats asked themselves the same question, Army High Command indignantly answered that they did not assume that a king would want to separate his fate from that of his troops.<sup>46</sup> Once again, though, Nikita did not conform to Austrian expectations. On the 18 January, he moved from Podgorica to Skutari; on the 20th he boarded a ship in the Albanian port of San Giovanni di Medusa. He did not stay with his Italian in-laws, however, but immediately left for France. The Austrians only learnt that he had left the country on 24 January, when an Italian newspaper carried the story.

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In the meantime, the debate about the fate of Montenegro and the Petrovic dynasty had attracted the interest of many “distinguished foreigners”. In Berlin, Foreign Secretary Jagow saw an opportunity “to tick off one of the items on our agenda” (“*eine unserer vielen Programmnummern einmal abzuschließen*”). Wistfully, he added, if there was an agreement with Montenegro that was supposed to include Serbia, the Entente would be deprived of both reason and pretext to go on fighting in the Balkans.<sup>47</sup> Already on 10 January, the Kaiser had stated his opinion that every effort should be made to conclude a separate peace with Montenegro.<sup>48</sup> Even better, Jagow had just found out that Montenegro had not even declared war on Germany but only broken off relations in 1914.<sup>49</sup>

A week later, Prince Gottfried Hohenlohe, the well-connected Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, reported the prevalent view in Berlin that a peace treaty with Montenegro might be followed by similar moves on the part of other states. On 20 January, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg specifically asked to see Hohenlohe about the Montenegrin question. Bethmann did not want to ruffle any feathers and stated at the outset that the question was up to the Austrians exclusively. Yet, he continued, he could not help wondering about the good impression it would create, if the first state that voluntarily (!) left the Entente, was not treated too harshly. He went on to suggest that after all Montenegro might easily be compensated for her losses on the Adriatic by Serb territory. It would be a death blow to Russian prestige if Alexander II’s “only friend” were to pay allegiance to Francis Joseph. Montenegro could thus be used as a bait that might persuade others to make peace with the Central Powers.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>46</sup> HHStA, PA I 953, fol. 348 v., 17 Jan. 1916.

<sup>47</sup> Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Botschaft Wien geheim 7, Jagow to Tschirschky, 15 Dec. 1915.

<sup>48</sup> Gottfried & Henriette Hohenlohe diary, 10 Jan. 1916.

<sup>49</sup> Scherer/Grunewald I 253 (letter to Tschirschky, 15 Jan. 1916).

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 20 Jan. 1916; HHStA, PA I 953, fol. 27, 51, Telegrams No. 21 & 28, 20/22 Jan. 1916.

True to form, Burian was prepared to defend Austrian claims against all comers. He angrily rejected any sort of good advice from big brother in Berlin. “Mild treatment” would be a mistake and quite undeserved. After all, Montenegro had attacked the monarchy without any pretext or provocation; the districts Bethmann had assumed could easily be handed over to Montenegro were mostly Albanian, anyway.<sup>51</sup> As for the propagandistic value of a generous treaty with Montenegro, he wondered whom exactly Bethmann had in mind. Serbia would certainly not be tempted – and as for Belgium, the only other small state at war with the Central Powers, that was a question for Germany to be generous about.<sup>52</sup> That was only one side of the coin, though. Behind that façade Burian did concede that if possible he would not like to forgo “the political benefices of definitely having eliminated one of our enemies”.<sup>53</sup>

#### THE PETROVIC VACUUM

Whereas Conrad had the Army Commander Archduke Frederick write to Burian to repeat his view that the surest and most suitable solution was also the most radical one: annexation, Burian preferred a more elegant approach. The optimum solution as laid down in the instructions for Eduard Otto, the former Austrian ambassador to Cetinje, was to reduce Montenegro to its pre-1912 borders and put it into a position vis-à-vis the Monarchy like the princely states of India to the British crown. Nikita should not be deposed but Montenegro should have no foreign relations with any other state and put its army at the disposal of the monarchy. For appearances sake, the latter clause could be incorporated into a secret annex of the peace treaty.<sup>54</sup>

The trouble was: Who do I call? Now that Nikita had gone into exile, who was in charge of Montenegro? The government claimed that according to the 1905 constitution the government automatically had to act as a regency in the event of both the King and the Crown Prince being out of the country. Danilo and his German wife, Augusta Charlotte von Mecklenburg-Strelitz, had been staying at San Remo for some time. The fly in the ointment was that the government eager to negotiate with the Austrians was a rump Cabinet,

51 There had been fighting with Albanians in Podgorica on 24 January. When Prince Mirko complained to the Austrians that Albanians were massacring Montenegrins; Thurn dismissed it as a “little brawl” (PA I 953, Thurn telegram No. 836, 24 Jan. 1916).

52 HHStA, PA I 953, fol. 36, Burian to Hohenlohe, 21 & 24 Jan. 1916; the more diplomatic version handed over by Hohenlohe in Scherer/Grunewald I 261.

53 HHStA, PA I 953, fol. 427, Burian to Wiesner, 20 Jan. 1916. Burian also criticized the army's wish to deprive Montenegro of all territory east of the river Tara. See his marginal note on Archduke Frederick's letter: “Zu was nehmen wir Andrejevica?”

54 HHStA, PA I 953, fol. 276-281, instructions for Otto, 19 Jan. 1916.

only. Montenegro boasted of an admirably slim cabinet of no more than four ministers. But Prime Minister Lazar Mijuskovic – even though reportedly in favour of peace - had joined the king in exile. The remaining trio – presided over by the Minister of Justice Marko Radulovic – unconvincingly claimed that only the advancing Austrian troops had prevented the king from sending them plenipotentiary powers in writing.<sup>55</sup> On 28 January, they reassured Otto that they were confident they could make the king sign a peace treaty.

90 At the same time, the military tried to take advantage of the situation created by Nikita's "flight". Conrad argued that even if he wanted to, Nikita would be unable to escape the clutches of his allies again. Thus, "he could see no one under the present conditions with whom one could negotiate". A capitulation signed by two "herrenlose" Montenegrin officers would be completely devoid of value. From Conrad's point of view, this was a heaven sent opportunity to do away with the Petrovic dynasty for good. The best way to do so, in his mind, was to use an appeal to the clan chiefs and have the rump-government organize a plebiscite.<sup>56</sup> Burian immediately squashed that idea because it smacked of either fraud and sham elections or, if taken seriously, of revolutionary people's sovereignty, even if the ultimate aim was a take-over by the monarchy.<sup>57</sup> Burian had his own doubts about the legitimacy of the rump-government. But he was willing to take them at their word: They should write to the king and ask for full powers. The note would be delivered to Nikita by the diplomatic service of Spain whose king, Alfonso XIII, was regarded as loyal to the cause of his mother's family and convinced of the Central Powers' victory.<sup>58</sup>

In the meantime, Eduard Otto as the man on the spot, was sounding out old contacts about possible alternatives, from the ex-Minister of Finance, Filip Jegovic, who had always been a confidant of the Austrians (!), and the court physician, Dr. Perasic, a former Austrian army doctor, to the conductor of the royal orchestra, a native Czech. The rump-government – and Popovic who usually acted as a go-between – was thinking about proclaiming Danilo king, if Nikita did not grant them full powers; if Danilo, too, was incapacitated, they would turn to Prince Mirko's son Michael. True, Michael happened to be abroad, too, and his mother, Mirko's estranged wife, was supposed to be under

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55 HHStA, PA I 953, Otto's telegram No. 8 reported that communications between Podgorica and the king had been open at all times.

56 HHStA, PA I 499, fol. 429, Conrad to Burian, 24 Jan. 1916; PA I 953, Thurn to Burian, 28 Jan. 1916, 10 p.m.

57 Conrad defended his point of view that the Petrovic dynasty could "hardly be regarded as the incarnation of the concept of Majesty", anyway. (HHStA, PA I 499, fol. 475, Conrad to Burian, 31 Jan. 1916.)

58 In fact, Alfonso, too, had urged the Austrians to exercise restraint (HHStA, PA I 953, Fürstenberg's report, 19 Jan. 1916).

Italian influence. But Michael was only seven years old; by the time he had come of age, the war would be over, anyway. In the meantime, the government would continue to act as a regency, a prospect that obviously appealed to them.<sup>59</sup>

Why not Mirko himself? The prince was the only Petrovic who had stayed in the country. He lived in his farm Krusevac near Podgorica. Mirko, too, claimed his father had entrusted the country to him in a last phone call.<sup>60</sup> But Otto agreed with Conrad that on account of his “marital difficulties” he had totally discredited himself in the eyes of the country.<sup>61</sup> Otto was not even sure whether he should pay a visit to Mirko. Burian advised him not to offend the Prince, who was sick. He should at least send an attache (the young Colloredo) to his bedside.<sup>62</sup> However, there seemed to be a party that was willing to flock to Mirko’s standard after all. In a volte-face, it was the old king’s party, the conservative Prevasi, led by the ex-ministers Petar Plamenac and Mitar Martinovic who persuaded themselves that Mirko represented the lesser evil.<sup>63</sup> To ratify such a decision they advised Otto to call a meeting of all present and previous members of parliament, the Skuptsina.

In the mean-time, Conrad continued to press for a military government to be set up in Montenegro. A move that was ever so correct in formal terms would be no substitute for resolute action.<sup>64</sup> By mid-February even Burian was inclined to agree with him. On 17 February the Spanish Ambassador in Vienna arrived with the bad news that the French would not permit any messages to be forwarded to Nikita, unless they were informed about the Austrian terms before-hand. Burian diagnosed yet another misunderstanding: In his opinion, the Spanish had been entitled to inform the French about their mission but had not been supposed to ask for their permission.<sup>65</sup> Even worse, already on 11 February, Mijuskovich had repudiated any Austrian offer out of hand. The Prime Minister-in-exile claimed the king had only initiated conversations with the Austrians to gain time for the Serbian Army to complete its retreat.<sup>66</sup>

59 HHStA, PA I 953, fol. 229, Otto’s telegram No. 5, 28 Jan. 1916. Danilo did not have any children.

60 HHStA, PA I 953, Otto report 4/P, 26 Feb. 1916.

61 HHStA, PA I 953, Otto’s telegram No. 15, 31 Jan. 1916. Mirko had married Natalija Konstantinovic, the daughter of a Serbian émigré colonel, in 1902 and divorced her in 1913 (Houston, *Nikola & Milena*, pp. 241-251; Treadway, *Falcon & Eagle* 176, 217). As usual, Conrad was far more outspoken and called Mirko “moralisch minderwertig”, even if pro-Austrian (PA I 499, fol. 306, 7 Dec. 1915).

62 HHStA, PA I 953, Otto’s telegram No. 32 & 38, 11 & 21 Feb. 1916.

63 HHStA, PA I 953, Otto’s telegrams 20 & 24, 3 / 4 Feb. 1916.

64 HHStA, PA I 953, fol. 49, 4 Feb. 1916.

65 HHStA, PA I 953, fol. 120-123, Musulin’s note.

66 The King was also supposed to have ordered his C-in-C, Gen. Janko Vukotic, a cousin of his wife (Treadway, *Falcon and Eagle*, p. 30), to continue fighting. Vukotic argued he had only been appointed on 17 January – and dismissed four days later by the rump-government; HHStA, PA I 953, report 41-B/P, 11 April 1918; Pavlovic, *Balkan Anschluss*, p. 80.

Immediately after getting the news from Spain, in the late afternoon of 17 February, Burian drafted a telegram to his representative at Army headquarters. He admitted it was indeed no longer possible to dispense with any central authority in Montenegro. The army should start setting up an administrative machinery, as far as possible making use of local personnel, but for the time being do so unobtrusively and without creating any stir.<sup>67</sup> On 28 February, the Spanish formally despaired of their mission. Once it had become public knowledge, it was impossible for them to continue their mediation efforts “sans s’exposer aux inutiles et desagréables conséquences.”<sup>68</sup> Instead, it might be argued, the failure to contact their monarch in exile did have disagreeable consequences for Montenegro. Two days later, on 1 March 1916 the Austrians formally installed a provisional military government.<sup>69</sup>

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Thus, the Austrians did not manage to celebrate an “Erstlingsfriede” in 1916. (To do so they later had to invent a partner of their own – the Ukraine.) Nor did they try and set up a puppet or collaborationist government. Burian wanted to keep all his options open. In the light of later controversies about lenient peace terms, with the Austrians advocating concessions in the West, the debates of early 1916 have an ironic ring to them. On the one hand, Montenegrin relations with her “big brother” Serbia might be compared with Austrian attitudes towards her over-mighty ally Germany. The creation of integrated military command structures was supposed to make it more difficult for Nikita to conclude a separate peace just as similar arguments were later heard about the practical impossibility of an Austrian break with Germany.<sup>70</sup> On the other hand, it has been argued that compared with the “thoroughness” of German war aims programmes, the Austrians might be considered to have been guided by counsels of “wise moderation”.<sup>71</sup> The Montenegrin case does not bear out that assertion. If anything, it showed that both the Central Powers were prepared to be generous with their allies’ interests.

In fact, it was the Prussians who continued to favour Nikita. When later in the year Burian and Bethmann got together to compare notes on possible peace terms, Bethmann remarked that an annexation of Montenegro was going a bit too far. Jagow feared that such a proposal would provoke cries of fury on the

67 HHStA, PA I 953, fol. 114, 17 Feb. 1916, 5:20 p.m.

68 HHStA, PA I 953, fol. 205.

69 In fact, the Austrians did not wait for the announcement of the Spanish mission’s failure. Burian approved Conrad’s *ah. Vortrag* of 23 on 26 Feb. The occupation forces initially consisted of 22 battalions, the equivalent of two divisions; a force double that size was needed for the Austrian zone in Serbia; ÖULK IV 116.

70 Enne, *Offensive*, pp. 70, 131; Ottokar Czernin, *Im Weltkrieg*, Wien, 1919, p. 25.

71 Rumpler, *Kriegsziele*, p. 477.



part of the Entente public – a suggestion that prompted a retort from Burian that German appetite for the ore-mines of Briey was far more likely to do so.<sup>72</sup> Jagow wanted Montenegro to keep Skutari because without that fertile plain the Black Mountains could not be properly fed.<sup>73</sup> That suggestion highlighted another disagreement: The Germans had lost any hope in the usefulness of an independent Albania. However, Burian held fast to that last achievement of Habsburg diplomacy during the Balkan Wars. If Serbia or Montenegro were allowed to survive, the land of the Skipetars was still needed as a counter-weight.

Significantly, when Berlin – in a last minute effort to prevent the break with the US – consented to outline their peace terms to Wilson confidentially in early 1917, their proposals included a suggestion that Serbia and Montenegro should be united under Nikita's rule.<sup>74</sup> Count Gyula Andrássy, waiting in the wings for a chance to become Austro-Hungarian Foreign Secretary, like his father, also let it be known that he favoured such a solution.<sup>75</sup> From Cetinje, Otto warned that Montenegrins would accept annexation only if Serbia was annexed, too. He also claimed, Montenegrins might have welcomed annexation by Austria in the early part of 1916;<sup>76</sup> in the meantime, however, they had been estranged by the way the military government had cold-shouldered the elites and started deporting suspects during the summer. A smouldering guerilla war in the remoter mountain districts that tied down about 40.000 Austrian soldiers by 1918, a far bigger number than in Serbia, was the result.<sup>77</sup>

Count Ottokar Czernin who succeeded Burian in December 1916 proved to be more flexible than his predecessor. He was willing to “mount the horse by its Serbian tail”, countenance the restoration of Montenegro (apart from the Lovcen and the coast-line), maybe even create a united Southern Slav state with access to the Adriatic. Such “a colossal concession” on Austria's part, he hoped,

72 HHStA, PA I 503, Liasse XLVII/3-16bis, fol. 157 (15/16th Nov. 1916); Wolfgang Steglich, *Bündnissicherung oder Verständigungsfrieden*, Göttingen, 1958, pp. 80, 90.

73 HHStA, PA I 503, Liasse XLVII/3-16bis, fol. 76 (10/11th Nov. 1916).

74 Arthur S. Link, Wilson. *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace 1916-1917*, Princeton, 1965, p. 257.

75 HHStA, PA I 1072, Bukarest, fol. 96 v., report of a conversation with Mackensen, 4 March 1917.

76 At that time the Austrians even tried to sell War Loan bonds to the Montenegrins but it was only “Muslims and Albanians” who could be persuaded to do so. 200.000 crowns were sold in Podgorica (HHStA, PA I 998, Liasse 49g, Report 40-A/P, 9 June 1916).

77 HHStA, PA I 998, Liasse 49f, Otto to Musulin, 30 Dec. 1916. Waves of arrests started after one interneer, Gen. Vesovic, had shot the lieutenant order to arrest him on 15 June 1916; after that all the young men in Vesovic's home district – up to 10.000 men – had been rounded up; after Rumania's entry into the war, most of them were being sent to Baldogasszony in Hungary (PA I 998, Liasse 49g, Report 41 A-B, 16 June 1916); see Brendel, *Besatzung*, pp. 139-142; Rastoder, *Montenegro*, p. 318.

would also prompt Germany to throw in a bit of Alsace, too.<sup>78</sup> He did not intend to offer the Montenegrins a deal right now, however, but wanted to do so only shortly before a general peace conference.<sup>79</sup> In August 1917, he suggested that Prince Mirko might be groomed for the task of ruling a pro-Austrian Slav statelet.<sup>80</sup> In April 1916, Mirko had moved to Vienna where he was treated by Professor Zuckerkandl, ironically one of Clemenceau's brother's in-laws.<sup>81</sup> Though he was still referred to as a POW, the Austrian government gave him an allowance that was raised to 6.000 crowns a month in February, 1917. But that option, too, was closed when Mirko died in March 1918.<sup>82</sup>

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Throughout the war, there had been an *embarras de richesse* of rumours and hints about Montenegrin willingness to come to an agreement with the Central Powers. But no “smoking gun” has yet been found that points at any action that could be described as “traitorous”. Yet, for the Entente, these rumours sounded plausible enough to create an atmosphere that was quite conducive to the idea of handing Montenegro over to the Serbs. The Austrians were not all that appreciative, either. The occupation authorities commented with principled outrage when describing a couple of local notables. They are “political opportunists of the worst kind. Everybody here is.”<sup>83</sup> But then, what else should a small country do, when giants fight. And sometimes a little bit more opportunism might have done the giants no harm, either.

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78 Scherer/Grünwald II 50-60, Mtg. with Bethmann on 26 March 1917. Now, in Czernin's plans it was Rumania's turn to be partitioned between Austria and Russia except for a tiny statelet the size of Monaco or Liechtenstein at the estuary of the Danube.

79 HHStA, PA I 1074, Cetinje, fol. 102, Czernin to Otto, 18 August 1917.

80 Ernst Deuerlein (ed.), *Briefwechsel Hertling-Lerchenfeld 1912-1917*, Boppard, 1973, p. 905 (report of a visit to Crown Prince Rupprecht on 12 Aug. 1917).

81 Georges Clemenceau's brother Paul and Emil Zuckerkandl had married the two daughters of Moritz Szeps; Sophie and Bertha; cf. Jean Baptiste Duroselle, *Clemenceau*, Paris, 1988, p. 199.

82 HHStA, PA XVII 50, Liasse XVI: Prince Mirko. Shortly afterwards, a loud-mouthed intelligence officer, Major Langauer, asked Plamenac what he thought about the idea of uniting Serbia and Montenegro under the sceptre of Archduke Max, the Emperor's younger brother. PA I 998, Liasse 49f, Report 26, 29 April 1918; Langauer's own defence, AOK Nr. 31.049, 17 June 1918.

83 HHStA, PA I 1074, Skutari, fol. 40, Report Military Government of Serbia, 10 March 1917.

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### Mathieu Dubois

Agrégé et docteur en histoire de l'université Paris-Sorbonne et de l'Universität Augsburg (Allemagne). Ancien *Fellow* du *Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung* (Potsdam), il est actuellement coordonateur du programme franco-allemand ANR-DFG « Les évacuations dans l'espace frontalier franco-allemand (1939-1945) ». Il est chargé d'enseignements à l'université Paris-Sorbonne. Il a notamment publié *Génération politique : les années 1968 dans les jeunesse des partis politiques en France et en RFA*, Paris, PUPS, 2014 (mention spéciale du Prix de thèse du Sénat).

### David Gallo

Ancien élève de l'ENS-LSH (Lyon), agrégé et docteur en histoire, ATER à l'université Paris-Sorbonne ; il a soutenu en 2014 une thèse sur *La Fabrique de l'homme nouveau : formation idéologique et conditionnement politique dans la SS (1933-1945)*, sous la direction des professeurs Édouard Husson (université de Picardie) et Dominique Barjot (université Paris Sorbonne).

### Philippe Gelez

Maître de conférences à l'université Paris-Sorbonne. Il enseigne la littérature et l'histoire des idées de l'espace ex-yougoslave et dirige un séminaire de

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### Lothar Höbelt

Professeur d'histoire moderne et contemporaine à l'université de Vienne, spécialiste de l'histoire autrichienne, allemande et britannique, ses travaux portent notamment sur l'histoire politique et constitutionnelle. Parmi ses nombreuses publications : *Landschaft und Politik im Sudetenland*, Wien, Österreichische Landsmannschaft, 2004 ; *Ferdinand III. 1608-1657. Friedenskaiser wider Willen*, Graz, Ares, 2008 ; *Franz Joseph I. Der Kaiser und sein Reich. Eine politische Geschichte*, Wien, Böhlau, 2009 ; *Die Habsburger. Aufstieg und Glanz einer europäischen Dynastie*, Stuttgart, Theiss, 2009 ; *Böhmen. Eine Geschichte*, Wien, Karolinger Verlag, 2012.

### Catherine Horel

Directrice de recherche au CNRS (SIRICE). Spécialiste de l'histoire contemporaine de l'Europe centrale, elle enseigne à l'université Panthéon-Sorbonne. Elle est membre de plusieurs organismes internationaux et Secrétaire générale du Comité international des sciences historiques (CISH). Ses recherches traitent des structures sociopolitiques de l'Empire des Habsbourg, de l'histoire urbaine, de l'histoire des juifs. Parmi ses récentes publications, à

signaler : *Cette Europe qu'on dit centrale. Des Habsbourg à l'intégration européenne (1815-2004)*, Paris, Beauchesne, 2009 ; Catherine Horel (dir.), *1908, la crise de Bosnie dans le contexte européen cent ans après*, Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2011 ; *L'Amiral Horthy, régent de Hongrie*, Paris, Perrin, 2014 ; Catherine Horel (dir.), *Les Guerres balkaniques 1912-1913. Conflits, enjeux, mémoires*, Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2014.

### **Rainer Hudemann**

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Professeur d'histoire contemporaine de l'Allemagne et des pays germaniques à l'université de Paris-Sorbonne et professeur émérite d'histoire contemporaine à l'université de la Sarre (Allemagne). Il a été vice-président de l'université de la Sarre, professeur invité à l'Université hébraïque de Jérusalem, titulaire de la chaire Alfred Grosser et professeur invité à l'Institut d'études politiques de Paris. Ses principaux domaines de recherche portent sur l'histoire allemande et française aux XIX<sup>e</sup> et XX<sup>e</sup> siècles, sur les relations franco-allemandes, les élites en France et en Allemagne, la politique sociale, les partis politiques, l'intégration européenne, les fascismes en Europe, l'histoire urbaine dans une perspective comparative, les structures de processus de transfert en Europe, les mémoires transnationales.

### **Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie**

Ancien élève de l'École normale supérieure, professeur émérite au Collège de France, ancien administrateur général de la Bibliothèque nationale et membre de l'Institut (Académie des sciences morales et politiques), Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie compte parmi les historiens français les plus célèbres. Auteur d'ouvrages traduits dans le monde entier, il fut nommé docteur *honoris causa* de dix-neuf universités. Grand Officier de la Légion d'Honneur et Commandeur de l'ordre des Arts et des Lettres, sa recherche actuelle porte sur l'histoire du climat.

### **Georgiana Medrea**

Maître de conférences qualifié, docteur en histoire moderne et contemporaine de l'université Paris-Sorbonne et de l'université de Bucarest. Sa thèse consacrée aux relations culturelles franco-roumaines dans l'entre-deux-guerres ainsi que ses contributions à des ouvrages collectifs tiennent à la fois de l'histoire diplomatique, de l'art, des institutions littéraires et culturelles. Elle participe depuis 2000 aux travaux du comité d'historiens franco-roumains dirigés par Jean-Paul Bled (université Paris-Sorbonne) et Dan Berindei, vice-président de l'Académie roumaine, publiés dans *Études danubiennes* et *Revue roumaine d'histoire*.

### **Renaud Meltz**

Maître de conférences à l'université de Polynésie française, est l'auteur d'*Alexis Léger, dit Saint-John Perse*, Paris, Flammarion, 2008 (Prix Maurice Baumont). Ses travaux portent actuellement sur l'opinion publique dans les relations internationales. Il prépare à ce sujet un ouvrage à paraître chez Vendémiaire en 2016, *Vers une diplomatie des peuples? L'opinion publique et les crises internationales au premier XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle (France et Grande-Bretagne)*.

### **Edi Miloš**

Maître de conférences à l'université de Split, il axe ses recherches sur l'histoire politique et intellectuelle des Croates aux XIX<sup>e</sup> et XX<sup>e</sup> siècles. Il est l'auteur d'une thèse de doctorat encore inédite *Antun Radić et la genèse du mouvement paysan croate (1868-1905)*, dirigée par le professeur Jean-Paul Bled et soutenue en 2008 à l'université Paris-Sorbonne.

### **Vojislav Pavlović**

Docteur de l'université Paris-Sorbonne, il a été maître de conférences associé dans plusieurs universités en France et en Serbie. Il est actuellement vice-directeur de l'Institut d'études balkaniques de Belgrade. Il a notamment publié *Francuskarevolucija [La Révolution française]*, Beograd, Vidici, 1990; *OSS in Yugoslavia 1941-1944*, Beograd, Center for Serbian Studies, 1997; *Od Monarhije do republike (De la monarchie à la république. Les États-Unis et la Yougoslavie pendant la seconde guerre mondiale)*, Beograd, Clio, 1998.

### **Guillaume Payen**

Docteur en histoire contemporaine, chef du pôle Histoire et faits sociaux contemporains du centre de recherche de l'École des officiers de la Gendarmerie nationale, chercheur associé au Centre Roland Mousnier (UMR 8596), Guillaume Payen a soutenu sa thèse en 2010 sous la direction de Jean-Paul Bled: *Racines et combat. L'existence politique de Martin Heidegger: patriotisme, nationalisme et engagement d'un intellectuel européen jusqu'à l'avènement du nazisme (1889-1933)*. Sa biographie du philosophe sera publiée en janvier 2016 aux éditions Perrin sous le titre: *Les Destins changeants de Martin Heidegger. Catholicisme, révolution, nazisme (1889-2014)*.

### **André Reszler**

Historien, né à Budapest, il a enseigné la littérature comparée et l'histoire européenne de 1968 à 1975 à l'université d'Indiana (Bloomington) et, à partir de cette date jusqu'à sa retraite en 1998, l'histoire des idées et de la culture européenne à l'Institut universitaire d'études européennes où il a succédé à

Denis de Rougemont. Depuis 1998, il est professeur honoraire à la faculté des Lettres de l'université de Genève. À plusieurs reprises, il a été invité à l'université de Montréal et à l'Institut d'études germaniques de Strasbourg. Fondateur de la revue *Cadmos*, il en est le rédacteur en chef de 1977 à 1983. Parmi ses publications, traduites en plusieurs langues : *L'Esthétique anarchiste*, Paris, PUF, 1973 ; *Mythes politiques modernes*, Paris, PUF, 1981 ; *Le Génie de l'Autriche-Hongrie*, Genève, Georg, 1991 ; *Le Pluralisme, aspects historiques et théoriques des sociétés pluralistes*, Paris, La Table Ronde, 2002 ; et *Les Nouvelles Athènes, histoire d'un mythe culturel européen*, Gollion, Infolio, 2004.

### **Christophe Réveillard**

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Christophe Réveillard est responsable de recherches au Centre Roland Mousnier (UMR 8596) et professeur module européen Jean Monnet (Commission européenne, Programmes et coopération internationale). Docteur en histoire (université Paris-Sorbonne) et diplômé en droit international public (université Paris-Sud), il est secrétaire-général-adjoint du Comité français des sciences historiques et membre de l'Institut international d'études européennes A. Rosmini. Il a notamment publié le *Dictionnaire historique et juridique de l'Europe* (Paris, PUF, 2013) ; *Métiers et statuts sociaux. Les représentations* (Paris, Éditions du CTHS, 2012) ; *La Construction européenne* (Paris, Ellipses, 2012) ; *La Guerre civile perpétuelle. Aux origines modernes de la dissociété* (Perpignan, Artège, 2012) ; (dir.) « Fatalités européennes », *Géostratégiques*, n° spécial, 2012-1 ; *La Culture du refus de l'ennemi. Modérantisme et religion en Europe au seuil du XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Limoges, Presses universitaires de Limoges, 2007) ; *Penser et construire l'Europe 1919-1992* (Paris, CNED/SEDES, 2007) ; *L'Américanisation de l'Europe occidentale au XX<sup>e</sup> siècle. Mythe et réalité* (Paris, PUPS, 2002).

### **Benedikt Schoenborn**

*Senior Research Fellow* au *Tampere Peace Research Institute* enseignant à l'université de Tampere, en Finlande. Parmi ses publications figurent les livres *Transatlantic Relations since 1945: an Introduction* (avec Jussi Hanhimäki et Barbara Zanchetta), London, Routledge, 2012, et *La Mécontente apprivoisée: de Gaulle et les Allemands, 1963-1969*, Paris, PUF, 2007 (Prix Duroselle).

### **Ana-Maria Stan**

Docteur en histoire, Ana-Maria travaille comme chercheur à l'université Babeş-Bolyai de Cluj-Napoca (Roumanie). Elle est responsable du Musée historique de l'université. Ancienne boursière de l'Agence universitaire de la francophonie (2002-2004). Sa thèse, soutenue en 2005 et publiée en 2006 (édition roumaine) et en 2007 (édition française), porte sur les relations franco-



roumaines à l'époque du régime de Vichy. Auteur de quelques livres et d'une vingtaine d'articles sur l'histoire du xx<sup>e</sup> siècle, ciblant les rapports culturels et la collaboration scientifique et académique entre la France et la Roumanie de 1918 à 1945, ainsi que l'histoire de l'enseignement supérieur roumain pendant l'entre-deux-guerres. En 2012, elle a édité le journal de Jacqueline Jeannel – *Ma Roumanie/România mea*, Cluj-Napoca, Centrul de Studii Transilvane, Academia Română.



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En 1470, Jean Heynlin, prieur de la Sorbonne, installe, dans le cadre universitaire, la première imprimerie française. L'atelier, animé par les prototypographes Ulrich Gering, de Constance, et Michel Friburger, de Colmar, imprime en Sorbonne les ouvrages destinés à la communauté universitaire : classiques latins et ouvrages d'érudition pour les étudiants et leurs maîtres. Ce fut l'origine de l'édition en France.

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